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ARTICLES
The Powell-Stevens Debates on Federalism
and Separation of Powers*
by LESLIE BENDER**
Introduction
According to a well-known saying, a camel is a horse designed by a
committee. United States Supreme Court decisions construing the fed-
eral Constitution may be characterized as that camel. American constitu-
tional law, like the Constitution itself, emerges from the interplay of
many different justices' legal and political philosophies and is the product
of compromise and debate rather than of a single plan or philosophy.
The Supreme Court represents a committee trying to improvise a con-
temporary equus from horse plans drafted by a different committee cen-
turies ago.
Committees, and groups in general, are more than the sum of the
individuals that comprise them and more than the reflections of their
leaders or spokespersons. Much of their character develops from the re-
lationships between group members. Examination of these relationships
may yield more insight into the group's behavior and diiection than stud-
ies of individual members. Therefore, studying the interaction between
Supreme Court justices will help explain how plans for a horse resulted
in a peculiar looking camel.
Traditional analysis of the interaction of Supreme Court members
often focuses on the contest between the leaders of liberal and conserva-
tive factions. Yet resting conclusions about the internal dynamics of the
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Court solely on the positions of Justices Brennan or Marshall vis-i-vis
Chief Justices Burger or Rehnquist is too facile. A limited examination
of judicial interaction between justices who fall into clearly opposing ide-
ological camps yields only a shallow understanding of the impact of the
Court's "centrists" or "moderates." The Court consists of nine justices,
each with an equal opportunity to affect the direction of Supreme Court
jurisprudence and to influence his or her colleagues' decisions in each
case. The moderates, whose votes are available to those ideologues who
are willing to compromise, may perform the most subtle maneuvering on
the Court. Alternatively, the justices who have been labelled as flexible
moderates may instead have rigid legal and political views. Examining
their relationships will reveal much about the evolution of American
constitutional law. Starting from this premise, this study focuses on the
volatile relationship between two of the Court's purported centrists, Jus-
tices Powell and Stevens.
During the eleven and a half years they served together on the
Supreme Court, Justices Lewis F. Powell and John Paul Stevens,' both
centrists by reputation,2 engaged in vehement debate over issues of sepa-
1. Justice Powell was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1971 by President Nixon and
resigned on June 26, 1987. After graduating first in his class from the Washington and Lee
College of Law, Justice Powell joined a prestigious Richmond, Virginia law firm, eventually
becoming a named partner. Neuborne, Lewis F Powell, Jr., in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIvEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 63 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter THE JUSTICES]. In his private practice Powell represented predominantly corporate and
wealthy clients. Id. at 72; Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70
MICH. L. REv. 445, 446 (1972). He also served as president of the American Bar Association
and chairman of the Richmond School Board for 10 years.
Justice Stevens was appointed to the Supreme Court from the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1975. He studied law at Northwestern University Law School, where he was an
outstanding student. Orland, John Paul Stevens, in 5 THE JUSTICES at 149; CURRENT BIO-
GRAPHY YEARBOOK 1976, at 390. Stevens served as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice
Rutledge during the 1947 term and then returned to Chicago to work as an associate in a
prestigious law firm. Orland, supra, at 150. Stevens' interest in antitrust law led him to his
role as Associate Counsel to the House Antitrust Subcommittee and to adjunct teaching posi-
tions at the Northwestern and University of Chicago law schools. Id. In 1970, Stevens was
appointed to a seat on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 149.
2. In reality, Justices Powell and Stevens should not be viewed as "centrists." Their
voting records reveal patterns that may have been obscured by popular media accounts. Data
for the following analysis of voting patterns was collected from the annual Harvard Law Re-
view Supreme Court statistical surveys. Copies of the author's compilations of voting patterns
are available from the author upon request.
To understand the political alliances of Justices Powell and Stevens, their voting records
must be compared with those of the Court's major liberals, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
and the Court's foremost conservatives, Chief Justice Rehnquist and former Chief Justice Bur-
ger. A comparison of the frequency with which Burger and Rehnquist voted together and the
frequency with which Powell agreed with these conservatives reveals that Powell is firmly
entrenched in the conservative camp. Burger and Rehnquist had an 82% agreement rate for
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ration of powers and federalism. Because many commentators regard
these justices as moderates,3 this debate has attracted relatively little at-
tention.4 Nevertheless, the justices' prolonged and often heated dialogue
the 1976-1985 Terms, the last four of which they agreed at a rate of 88%. Powell agreed with
Burger and Rehnquist at a ten-term average rate of 77%, and at an average of 84% for the last
four years of those terms. Brennan, on the other hand, agreed with the conservative faction
only 46% of the time during the same period. Brennan and Marshall voted together 90% of
the time over the last 10 years. Powell voted with Brennan and Marshall at a ten-term average
rate of 53%. Even justices in opposing factions agree with one another at least 40% of the
time; for example, from 1976-1985, Brennan and Burger agreed 46% of the time and Brennan
and Rehnquist agreed 40% of the time. Therefore, Powell's agreement rate with the liberal
faction is surprisingly low.
Stevens is more of a centrist. He averaged a 55% agreement rate with Burger and Rehn-
quist during the last 10 terms and the last four terms. Although Stevens' voting record is more
similar to Brennan's, who agreed with the conservative faction 46% of the time, than to Pow-
ell's, who agreed with the conservatives 77% of the time, Stevens' average agreement rate with
the liberal justices, Brennan and Marshall, was 62% for the last 10 terms, and 68% for the last
four terms. Stevens' 62% liberal and 55% conservative average agreement rates differ signifi-
cantly from Powell's 53% liberal and 77% conservative average agreement rates. Stevens may
be characterized as slightly more liberal than conservative, yet independent from a distinct
political faction, while Powell may be accurately identified as a conservative.
Less than one-third of all Supreme Court decisions are decided by a five-to-four vote. Of
145 decisions in the 1986 Term, 45 cases were five-to-four decisions. The Supreme Court, 1986
Term - Leading Cases, 101 HARv. L. Rnv. 119, 365 (1987). Stevens voted with the majority
in 18 of these 45 cases and Powell in 35. In the 1985 Term, Powell cast the swing vote in 78%
of the split decisions, but created a liberal majority in only five percent of the five-to-four
decisions. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 100, 307
(1986). Powell's voting record reveals that he firmly supported the Court's conservative fac-
tion. Powell voted with Burger and Rehnquist in 84% of the cases decided in the 1986 Term.
The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REv. 119, 362-65 (1987).
Stevens' position is less ideologically clear than Powell's. In the 1986 Term, Stevens cast
the swing vote in 18 cases, voting 13 times with Brennan and Marshall and five times with
Rehnquist. Stevens sided with the conservatives approximately as frequently as did Justice
Brennan. During the 1982 through 1986 Terms, Stevens voted with Brennan and Marshall in
68% of the cases.
Comparison of Powell's and Stevens' voting records further supports the conclusion that
neither may be accurately labelled as centrist. During their joint tenures on the Supreme
Court, Justices Powell and Stevens agreed an average of 56% of the time, while disagreeing an
average of 43% of the time. Thus the rate at which Stevens and Powell agreed with each other
differs only slightly from Stevens' 55% average agreement rate with the conservative faction,
and Powell's 53% average agreement rate with the liberal contingent. Ironically, these two
justices, who have both been labeled centrists, agreed only slightly more frequently than they
disagreed.
3. Recent commentary characterizing Powell as a centrist includes: Taylor, Powell's Piv-
otal Votes Marked '87 Court Term, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Roberts, In the
Balance: Reagan Gets His Chance to Tilt the High Court, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987, at El,
col. 1. Sitomer, in the Christian Science Monitor, said that Powell was "[k]nown as the man-
in-the-middle ... a balancer, a compromiser, a tipper of judicial scales," The High Court's
New 'Pivot'?, Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1987, at 27, col. 1.
4. The few articles written specifically about these justices do not address their long-term
debates or the significance of their relationship. See, eg., Kahn, The Court, the Community
and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987); Gun-
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has significantly influenced our constitutional law.5 Rather than acting
as "centrists", Powell and Stevens have often been important and deci-
sive voices on the Court. This Article studies the relationship, politics,
and ideologies of these two justices. The Article surveys Powell's and
Stevens' opinions in a variety of areas of law in order to give perspective
to their debates, and shed light on how the debates affect the develop-
ment of constitutional law.
Part I of this Article analyzes Powell's and Stevens' debate on sepa-
ration of powers, focusing in particular on their views of the Court's role
in implying rights of action under federal statutes and the Constitution.
Part II examines federalism issues arising under the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, as well as abstention and preemption issues that have di-
vided Powell and Stevens. The Conclusion of this Article presents an
assessment of the justices' views and the effects of their debates.
I. Separation of Powers Between the Congress
and Federal Courts
A. Implying Private Rights of Action under Federal Statutes
Stevens and Powell consistently differed in their approaches to judi-
cial implication of private rights of action under federal statutes. Powell
argued that the Court's implication of private rights of action under fed-
eral statutes usurped legislative authority. Stevens believed that because
the traditional role of courts is to remedy legal wrongs, courts have a
duty to imply damages to enforce statutory rights. This subsection ex-
plores major cases in which the justices confronted this issue.
Justice Stevens recognized the power of federal courts to imply dam-
ages and to fashion appropriate remedies for deprivations of statutory
ther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN.
L. REv. 1001 (1972); Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MicH.
L. REv. 445 (1972); Maltz, Portrait of a Man in the Middle-Mr. Justice Powell, Equal Protec-
tion, and the Pure Classification Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 941 (1979); Yackel, Thoughts on
Rodrigue" Mr. Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme
Court, 9 U. RiCH. L. REv. 181 (1975); Urofsky, Mr. Justice Powell and Education: The Bal-
ancing of Competing Values, 13 J. L. & EDuC. 581 (1984); Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protec-
tion Jurisprudence, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1146 (1987); Note, Death and a Rational Justice: A
Conversation on the Capital Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens, 96 YAL-E L.J. 521
(1987). See also Symposium 68 VA. L. Rv. 161 (1982) (5 articles and 3 dedications are con-
cerned with Justice Powell).
5. This Article analyzes Supreme Court jurisprudence solely by examining the writings
of Justices Powell and Stevens. The author studied every case in which both justices wrote an
opinion, or in which one justice wrote the majority opinion and the other joined a separate
concurrence or dissent., The Article focuses on cases involving the structure of government,
federalism, and separation of powers.
benefits in the absence of specific congressional directives,6 when plain-
tiffs fit within the class of persons for whose benefit Congress enacted the
legislation.7 Stevens strongly advocated private remedies for violation of
the following statutes: section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972,8 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936,10 section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940,11 section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,12 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,13 and the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972.14
Stevens explained his views in his Cannon v. University of Chicago
plurality opinion.'" Relying on the four-part test of Cort v. Ash,' 6 Justice
Stevens determined that the plaintiff had a damages action under Title
IX because (1) she was within the class of persons protected by the stat-
ute;17 (2) Congress intended to create a private right of action when it
modeled Title IX on Title VI; 8 (3) a private cause of action was consis-
6. See, eg., Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 120 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting, Stevens,
J., joining).
7. See generally Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
635 (1983)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1982). See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11, 25 (1979) (White, 3., dissenting, Stevens, J., joining).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982). See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983). Herman was a unanimous decision of the Court, but Justice Powell did not
participate.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
15. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, the plaintiff alleged that the University of Chicago
violated Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686, by dis-
criminating against women in its medical school admissions. The district court dismissed her
suit on the theory that Title IX neither expressly nor impliedly created a private right of
action. The court of appeals ruled that termination of federal funding was the exclusive rem-
edy for a Title IX violation. A divided Supreme Court reversed.
16. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
17. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
18. Id. at 703. Title IX contains provisions similar to the provisions in Title VI, which
lower courts have interpreted to include a private cause of action. See id. at 694-703. Focus-
ing on "the contemporary legal context", Stevens concluded, "[I]t is not only appropriate but
also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important
precedents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be inter-
preted in conformity with them." Id. at 699. Stevens also discerned Congress' intent to permit
private rights of action under Title IX from a review of the post-Title IX enactment of the
Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), which included Title IX among
Summer 19881 THiE POWELL-STEVENS DEBATE
554 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 15:549
tent with the legislative purpose to prevent discrimination;' 9 and (4)
since the Civil War the federal government has traditionally acted as a
major opponent of discrimination.20
Although Stevens managed to garner support from a plurality of the
Court in Cannon, Justice Powell vigorously dissented,2 arguing that by
implying a private right of action when Congress has been silent, the
federal court usurped Congress' legislative function.22 Powell main-
tained that when a statute specifically provides alternative enforcement
mechanisms, courts should not create other remedies.23 He particularly
criticized the four-part test of Cort v. Ash, finding only the legislative
intent factor relevant, and referring to the other Cort factors as "in-
dependent judicial lawmaking."'24 He called on the Court to overrule
Cort, complaining that in at least twenty decisions, federal appeals courts
had used Cort to imply private rights of action in federal statutes. 25 Pow-
ell argued that Congress could not "absentmindedly" have omitted pri-
vate causes of action in all those cases.26 According to Powell, the
judiciary overstepped its bounds by freely implying private actions.27
Besides the unconstitutionality of extending federal jurisdiction and
of judicial lawmaking, Powell argued that Cort presented another prob-
lem: it encouraged Congress to avoid resolving politically difficult issues
by relying on politically insulated courts to tackle the troublesome issue
of private remedies.28 He protested that this reliance on the courts un-
dermined the democratic process.29
Powell's view gained majority acceptance in Middlesex County Sew-
erage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.'0 In Middlesex,
the Court restricted its analysis to the issue of congressional intent. Pow-
ell's majority opinion echoed the arguments he presented in his Cannon
the actions for which attorney's fees are available to prevailing plaintiffs. Cannon, 441 U.S. at
706 n.41.
19. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707.
20. Id. at 708.
21. Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 743.
23. Id. at 748.
24. Id. at 740.
25. Id. at 741-42.
26. Id. at 742.
27. "By creating a private action, a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its
authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve. This... conflicts with
the authority of Congress under Art. III to set limits of federal jurisdiction." Id. (footnote and
citations omitted).
28. Id. at 743.
29. Id. at 747.
30. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
dissent: if a court looks beyond legislative intent, it violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. Dissenting in part in Middlesex, Stevens
bemoaned the effect of Powell's approach.31
Powell did not join the majority in the only two post-Cannon cases
in which the Court implied private remedies from federal statutes. In
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,32 the Court unanimously held that
section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act33 contained an implied
private right of action. Powell did not participate in Herman &
MacLean. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,34 Powell
registered a strong dissent. Writing for the majority, Stevens found that
the Commodity Exchange Act35 included a private right of action. As he
had in Cannon, Stevens reasoned that when a statute is silent on the issue
of remedies, the Court must look to the "contemporary legal context",
including recently decided cases, to determine congressional intent.36
Powell's response was consistent with his dissent in Cannon.37 He
argued that the Court's action violated principles of separation of powers
and traditional tests for discerning congressional intent.3" He criticized
the majority for interpreting congressional silence as congressional intent
to create a private cause of action.39 In addition, Powell argued that
because the penalty for congressional silence was the risk of having erro-
neous opinions imputed to Congress itself, Stevens' reasoning obligated
the legislature to respond to lower court opinions. 4 Powell reiterated his
view that courts should respect the careful and complex balances Con-
gress writes into its regulatory schemes. 4' Absent compelling evidence of
congressional intent, the courts should refuse to create a cause of
31. Id. at 22. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite Stevens'
complaints, other justices agreed with Powell's arguments for denying implied remedies for
violations of federal statutes. The Court's shift away from Stevens' view began before Middle-
sex. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
32. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1934).
34. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
35. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
36. MerrillLynch, 456 U.S. at 381. Stevens referred to a history of lower courts implying
a private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act. Stevens presumed that Con-
gress was aware of those decisions when it amended the Act and did not expressly preclude a
private remedy.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
38. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 395-96 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 402.
40. Id. at 408.
41. Id.
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action.42
In the implied cause of action cases, there is an intense debate be-
tween Powell and Stevens. Both justices drafted opinions responding to
the other's view on court interpretation of congressional intent. This de-
bate was not only a dialogue between the two justices, but also a means of
developing constitutional law. Stevens argued that courts must have the
power to fill the remedial gaps in statutes that Congress enacted to bene-
fit particular classes of people. This furthers congressional intent by as-
suring remedies for wrongs that Congress clearly sought to redress. In
contrast, Powell believed that Stevens' approach violated the doctrine of
separation of powers by allowing federal courts to create remedies at law,
a function constitutionally delegated to Congress. Stevens' argument
protected individuals whose congressionally granted rights were in-
fringed; Powell's protected the distribution of governmental powers be-
tween the courts and Congress. Although Powell first expressed his
opinion in dissent, he eventually persuaded a majority of the Court to
join him.
B. Implying Causes of Action Directly Under the Constitution
Powell and Stevens also disagreed over the Court's power to create
implied private causes of action under the Constitution. After the Court
recognized a private cause of action for violation of an individual's fourth
amendment rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,43 it began to examine whether violations of other
constitutional rights supported private causes of action. In Davis v. Pass-
man,44 an administrative assistant to a member of Congress sued her em-
ployer for firing her solely because she was a woman. Since she had been
on a federal congressional staff, Title VII did not apply and she based her
claim on the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan, with Justice Stevens
joining the five-member majority, applied the Bivens rationale to find a
private damages action for violation of the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart
dissented from the majority in Davis. Writing separately, Powell de-
scribed the majority decision as an affront to principles of separation of
42. Id. As recently as 1987, Powell and Stevens disagreed on whether a private cause of
action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be used to enforce tenants' rights secured by
federal law. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 107 S. Ct. 766
(1987).
43. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Brennan, J., writing for the majority). Bivens was decided before
Stevens and Powell were appointed to the Court.
44. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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powers and comity.45 He stated that the judiciary should be powerless to
interfere in the hiring practices of Congress, an equal branch of govern-
ment,46 unless Congress violates its own employment standards.4 7
Powell further criticized the majority for failing to exercise "princi-
pled discretion."'48 Even if the Court may hear this type of case, he ar-
gued, it has no obligation to permit private suits absent congressional
authorization.49 Powell stressed that the judiciary must carefully con-
sider the concerns of equal and coordinate branches of government
before creating implied causes of action for their employees under provi-
sions of the Constitution.50 Powell believed that Congress had deliber-
ately excluded itself from Title VII's prohibition against discriminatory
employment practices because members of Congress need to have abso-
lute confidence in their staff.51
Powell's disenchantment with the result in Davis did not prevent
him from joining the majority in Carlson v. Green.52 In Carlson, the
Court found that a federal prisoner could bring a private cause of action
directly under the Constitution to remedy eighth amendment violations.
Although he concurred in the result, Powell vehemently disagreed with
the majority's suggestion that implied causes of action for constitutional
violations could be defeated only in limited circumstances. 53
Powell's view eventually prevailed.-4 Since Carlson, plaintiffs have
generally failed to sustain implied private damages actions under the
Constitution." Powell joined the majority in each of the opinions failing
45. Id. at 251 (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also expressed dismay at this
encroachment upon the separation of powers. Justice Stewart dissented separately, and Justice
Rehnquist joined all three dissents.
46. For the same reason, Justice Powell also disapproved of judicial interference in execu-
tive hiring decisions. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
47. Davis, 442 U.S. at 254-55 (Powell, 3., dissenting).
48. Id. at 252, 254.
49. Id at 252.
50. Id
51. Id. at 254.
52. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In Carlson, an action brought on behalf of a prisoner who died
after being injured in jail, the plaintiffs claimed that the authorities' failure to provide proper
medical treatment violated the prisoner's eighth amendment rights.
53. Id. at 27-29. (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
54. See, eg., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983); United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
55. Although Bivens has not been overruled, the Court has found each case since Bivens to
fall within one of its exceptions. Plaintiffs were denied relief in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983) (unanimous decision denying black navy men a constitutionally derived damages
action against their commander for racial discrimination; decision based on the special factors
of military discipline and Congress' activity in the field); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)
(unanimous opinion by Stevens denying a federal employee a constitutionally based remedy
against his supervisor for alleged violation of his first amendment rights; decision based on
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to find constitutionally implied private damages actions. When the
Court has found constitutionally derived causes of action to exist, Powell
has consistently written that implication of a private constitutional cause
of action should be the exception and not the rule.56
Powell's and Stevens' disagreement on implied rights of action
stemmed in large part from their conflicting views on the role of the judi-
ciary. Powell firmly believed that the Court, as one of three equal
branches of government, lacked the power to create implied damages ac-
tions. Stevens, on the other hand, emphasized the unique functions of
the judiciary. Stevens argued that courts exist to provide remedies for
legal wrongs, such as statutory and constitutional violations. For Ste-
vens, these cases did not threaten the separation of powers, rather they
allowed courts to exercise their traditional powers to do justice by inter-
preting congressional schemes.
C. Other Cases on the Separation of Powers Between
Courts and Congress
Powell applied his separation of powers principles to other areas.
Heckler v. Day 7 involved the courts' power to fashion a remedy for So-
cial Security disability claimants whose cases had been unresolved for an
inordinate amount of time. A federal district court judge ordered the
state to decide all reconsideration petitions within ninety days.5" Writing
for the five-member majority, Powell found that the district court's ac-
tion violated separation of powers principles because it intruded upon the
discretionary power that Congress had vested in the Secretary of Health
and Human Services.59
Stevens joined Marshall's dissent in Heckler.'° The dissenters
existing, comprehensive remedial system exception to Bivens); and United States v. Stanley,
107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987) (five-to-four decision, with Powell in the majority and Stevens dissent-
ing, denying a serviceman a cause of action under the Due Process Clause for damage to his
personality from nonconsensual administration of LSD; decision based on military discipline
and alternative remedy exceptions to Bivens).
56. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 251 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 25 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
57. 467 U.S. 104 (1984).
58. Id. at 110.
59. Id. at 118-19. Congress had considered imposing mandatory deadlines, but consist-
ently refused to enact them. Id at 116. Powell found Congress' inaction unmistakable evi-
dence of congressional intent not to impose mandatory deadlines. Id at 117-18. Powell
repeatedly used the concept of "unmistakable congressional intent" to limit the federal courts'
power to act. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 465
U.S. 89 (1984); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), reh'g denied, 473 U.S.
926 (1985) and Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
60. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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viewed the district court's action as an appropriate remedial order. In
accordance with Stevens' examination of congressional intent in Can-
non61 and Merrill Lynch, 2 Marshall analyzed the contemporary legal
context of the issue. Marshall and Stevens argued that although Con-
gress did not create a nationwide deadline for resolution of claims, it did
not intend to curtail judicial innovation or the equitable power of the
courts to grant claimants their statutory entitlements.63
In 1986, however, Powell persuaded Stevens that implying a cause
of action would violate congressional intent. In Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,64 Stevens, writing for the majority,
did not question that the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)65 did not create a private cause of action for misbranding.66
Furthermore, the Merrell Dow majority found that Congress' failure to
create affirmatively a private cause of action revealed its intention to pre-
vent injured individuals from suing in federal court. 67
With the exception of Merrell Dow, Powell and Stevens ardently dis-
agreed about implied rights of actions and implied remedies. Powell
viewed judicial implication of private damages as a violation of separa-
tion of powers principles. Stevens, on the other hand, believed that the
judiciary was obligated to imply remedies for wrongs, especially when
congressional statutes were silent.
In his opinions, Powell adamantly argued that expansive judicial in-
terpretation of the nature or scope of legislation cut at the fabric of our
tripartite governmental structure. Therefore, he interpreted congres-
sional silence on private remedies as an intentional prohibition against
court action. For Powell, congressional silence limited the power of the
federal courts to act; for Stevens, it unleashed it. Justice Stevens, with
Justice Brennan's guidance from Cort, solved the problem of congres-
sional silence in a manner that loosened the bindings on courts' wrists: he
would permit courts to act unless Congress affirmatively prohibited court
action. Both Powell and Stevens claimed to deduce congressional intent
61. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
63. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 130 (Marshall, 3., dissenting).
64. 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. 111984) (amending ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)).
66. Merrell Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 3237. Plaintiffs sought damages for the birth defects their
children allegedly suffered as a result of the plaintiffs' ingestion of Bendectin, a morning sick-
ness drug, during pregnancy. Plaintiffs alleged that the drug was misbranded in violation of
the FDCA, and that violation of the federal statute was negligence per se under state tort law.
67. I'd at 3237. The Merrell Dow majority opinion does not shed light on the reasoning
behind Stevens' significant shift.
Summer 19881
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
from congressional silence and to comply with separation of powers
principles.
II. The Federalism Debates
The Powell-Stevens debates extended beyond the subject of separa-
tion of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. The justices also
held differing opinions on the proper allocation of powers between state
and federal governments. Frequently writing for the majority on this
issue, Powell stressed the role of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments in
preserving states' rights by specifically limiting the powers of Congress
and the federal courts. Stevens, along with the other dissenters, repeat-
edly rejected Powell's approach as an overly restrictive intrusion on legit-
imate exercises of federal power.6
In addition to tenth and eleventh amendment issues, Powell and Ste-
vens debated the judicially developed doctrines of abstention and pre-
emption. Their different conceptions of national unity and state
sovereignty are reflected in the Court's division over these federalism is-
sues. Many of the federalism cases were decided by five-to-four votes.
Powell emerged as a spokesperson on federalism issues, frequently writ-
ing majority opinions. The Powell-Stevens debates on eleventh amend-
ment issues are a potent resource for examining their conflicting views
and their judicial relationship. Further, Powell ended his career on the
Supreme Court with an opinion on the Eleventh Amendment that rein-
forced his consistent vision of federalism.69
A. State Sovereignty, Federal Courts, and the Eleventh Amendment
Although Justices Powell and Brennan were the primary players in
the Court's recent debate on the scope of state immunity from suit in
federal court, Stevens also performed a vital role. Stevens' and Powell's
clash over eleventh amendment matters during their joint tenure on the
Court reached a peak in the 1984 case of Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1I).7o
Prior to Pennhurst II, Justice Rehnquist had assumed the role of
spokesperson for eleventh amendment doctrine. His majority decisions
in Edelman v. Jordan,7' Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,72 and Quern v. Jordan73
68. See infra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
69. Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
70. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
71. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
72. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
73. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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severely restricted plaintiffs' opportunities to receive compensatory dam-
ages from a state in federal court for state-caused deprivations of rights
or statutory benefits. Justice Brennan opposed interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment as immunizing states from suits by their own citizens.74
Justice Stevens had a less radical approach to eleventh amendment juris-
prudence than Brennan, but he was more willing than Powell or Rehn-
quist to grant plaintiffs remedies in federal court for state transgressions.
He authored three decisions addressing eleventh amendment questions
before Pennhurst II. 7s In each case, Powell wrote a strong dissent on the
eleventh amendment issues.
Beginning with Pennhurst II, Powell articulated the Court's major-
ity position, which sharply curtailed the possibility of plaintiffs obtaining
any federal court relief against a state, its departments, or its agents.76
He even announced a major retrenchment of his eleventh amendment
theory in an opinion handed down in his last week on the Court.77  Jus-
tice Stevens consistently sought to undermine Powell's majority ap-
proach to state immunity from suit in federal court by joining the dissent
in five-to-four decisions on the issue.78 This dramatic split exemplifies
the disparate views of the Court's two factions about the meaning and
74. Brennan's approach differed significantly from the majority because he consistently
argued that the Eleventh Amendment, by its clear terms, does not bar remedies for citizens
suing their own states in federal court. Brennan argued that any such bar must be based on
common-law sovereign immunity. He then argued that there could be no bar based on com-
mon-law sovereign immunity because states had surrendered their common-law sovereign im-
munity by granting power to the federal government when they ratified the Constitution.
Employees of the Dep't of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 319 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 457 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). After repeated and eloquent attempts to achieve a majority on this
theory, and after Justice Powell had become the majority spokesperson on eleventh amend-
ment issues, Justice Brennan changed his strategy. He focused instead on the need to re-
examine the origin of the Eleventh Amendment and to expose the historical illegitimacy of the
ancestral eleventh amendment case, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See, eg., Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 260, (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 473
U.S. 926 (1985).
75. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670 (1982); Mahter v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
76. See Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 926 (1985);
Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I1), 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Since
1984, only two eleventh amendment majority opinions have been written by other justices.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (White wrote the five-justice majority opinion on the
eleventh amendment issue; Powell concurred, although he dissented on the equal protection
issue); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (Rehnquist wrote the five-to-four majority opin-
ion with Powell joining.)
77. Welch, 107 S. Ct. 2941; see infra text accompanying notes 118-124.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94, 109-112, & 125.
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demands of federalism. If Justice Powell's replacement, Justice Ken-
nedy, is as strong an advocate of state sovereignty as Powell was, his
presence will have little effect on the split, but in any case the Court will
have to deputize a new majority writer.
Powell and Stevens took opposing positions in Pennhurst II,79 as
they had in Cannon80 and Merrill Lynch.81 In Pennhurst II, however,
the majority sided with Powell. Writing for five justices, Powell deter-
mined that the Eleventh Amendment and concomitant considerations of
state sovereignty deprived the district court of the power to order state
officials to conform their conduct to state law.82 Powell declared that the
Eleventh Amendment's protection of state sovereign immunity imposes a
constitutional limitation on federal judicial power. 3 He characterized
eleventh amendment sovereign immunity as a federalism issue involving
the proper allocation of power between federal courts and state govern-
ments. Powell found that suits against state officials are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment when the state is the real party in interest, whether
the plaintiff is a citizen of that state or of another, and whether the suit
seeks damages or injunctive relief.8 4
Powell acknowledged exceptions to the eleventh amendment bar
when the state unequivocally waives its immunity by consenting to suit
in federal court, when Congress has clearly expressed its intention to ab-
rogate state immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and when a state officer has violated
a federal right.8" Powell found no evidence of waiver or congressional
abrogation of state immunity in the context of Pennhurst I.86 Neither
79. 465 U.S. 89. In Pennhurst II, mentally retarded state hospital residents challenged the
conditions in the facility, and the failure of state and county officials to provide adequate hous-
ing, training, and counseling. They alleged violations of their constitutional rights, as well as
violations of their federal and state statutory rights. Id. at 92. The Supreme Court was asked
to review the decision of the lower federal court which, upon finding violations of Pennsylvania
law, had ordered state officials to close the hospital, remove the patients from the institution,
and place them in the "least restrictive environment consistent with each individual's" needs.
80. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For a discussion of the debate between Powell and Stevens on
the implication of private remedies under federal statutes, see supra notes 6-42 and accompa-
nying text.
81. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this case and Powell's and Stevens' positions.
82. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 106.
83. Id. at 116.
84. Id. at 102.
85. For explanation of the exceptions to the eleventh amendment bar, see Welch v. State
Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941; Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234; and Pen-
nhurst II, 465 U.S. 89.
86. 465 U.S. at 103 n.12.
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did he find that Pennhurst II fit within the doctrine of Exparte Young,87
which permits plaintiffs to obtain equitable relief against state officials for
violation of federal law.
Powell concluded that claims for relief against state officials for vio-
lations of state law are barred even if the state law claims are pendent to
federal causes of action.88 Pendent jurisdiction, Powell reasoned, is a ju-
dicially created doctrine, and must therefore yield to the constitutional
limitations of the Eleventh Amendment. He acknowledged that this ra-
tionale could result in bifurcation of claims, but concluded that bifurca-
tion is an acceptable price to pay for adherence to principles of
federalism and sovereign immunity.89
In his dissenting opinion, Stevens argued that a state official who
violates state law is not acting on behalf of the state for purposes of elev-
enth amendment state immunity.90 Stevens explained that a sovereign
authorizes state officials to enforce state laws, not to violate state laws,
whether the violation is in good faith, negligent, or intentional. 91 He
concluded that government officials are stripped of sovereign immunity if
they act beyond the scope of their authority, or if they act in violation of
state law.92 The Eleventh Amendment, he said, does not require any
other rule.
The conflict between Powell and Stevens reached its peak on the
issue of eleventh amendment immunity. Stevens, with whom Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed, accused Powell of flouting
87. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young, Powell argued, is a narrow exception to the eleventh
amendment bar. The Young exception was designed to preserve federal supremacy and vindi-
cate federal interests in the few situations when those interests directly conflict with state sov-
ereignty. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 105. Powell concluded that Young must be applied with
the utmost care and circumspection because it treads on fundamental notions of state sover-
eignty. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), Powell reasoned that a strong national
commitment to federalism and respect for state sovereignty dictated limiting the application of
Young. Edelman established a balance between federal supremacy and state sovereignty by
limiting remedies against state officials in situations like Young to equitable, prospective relief,
because that type of relief does not intrude upon state coffers.
Justice Powell explained further in Pennhurst II that Young and Edelman are only rele-
vant to cases in which there is a dangerous conflict between principles of federal supremacy
and state sovereignty. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 105. Powell found that no such conflict ex-
isted in Pennhurst 11, because state officials were accused of violating state law: Therefore the
narrow Young-Edelman exception was inapplicable, and the general rule barring all relief
against a state or state official in federal court applied. Id. at 106.
88. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 122.
89. Id. at 147.
90. Id. at 147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 150.
92. Id at 157.
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twenty-eight precedential cases and a century ofjurisprudence. 93 Stevens
inveighed against the majority's misuse of the concept of federalism, and
denounced the consequence of the ruling, which would force plaintiffs to
split their causes of action between state and federal courts. Powell, as
highly critical of Stevens' dissent as Stevens was of Powell's majority,
answered Stevens' contentions in the text of the majority opinion. 4
Powell remarked in an ad hominem tone that "Justice Stevens' dissent
rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and most important would emascu-
late the Eleventh Amendment.1 95
The distinctions between Powell's and Stevens' federalism ideologies
are the most interesting aspect of their Pennhurst II opinions. Powell
argued that federalism means respect for state sovereignty in all its mani-
festations. Under Powell's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
federal constitutional supremacy is the only check on state sovereignty
and its attendant immunity. Powell concluded that permitting the Penn-
hurst II suit to be heard in federal court would be an affront to
federalism.
Stevens contended that his understanding of the Eleventh Amend-
ment was more compatible with federalism concerns than Powell's. Ac-
cording to his view, federalism is bolstered when federal courts require
state officers to follow state laws, and not when federal courts permit
state officers to ignore state mandates. Stevens added that Powell's rule
required the splitting of causes of action; a procedure more likely to
cause friction between state and federal courts than a rule requiring fed-
eral courts to respond to plaintiffs' claims that they have been harmed by
state officers acting inconsistently with state law. Both Powell and Ste-
vens justified their opposing conclusions by relying on the requirements
of federalism, although Stevens may have used federalism arguments
merely in response to Powell.
The dust had barely settled after the Pennhurst II decision when
Powell took advantage of another opportunity to strengthen state immu-
nity under the Eleventh Amendment.96 In Atascadero State Hospital v.
93. Id. at 165-66 n.50.
94. Id. at 106.
95. Id.
96. Between Pennhurst II and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, reh'g
denied, 473 U.S. 926 (1985), Powell wrote the majority opinion in County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). Oneida concerned Native American property claims aris-
ing from land sales made 175 years before the suit was instigated in alleged violation of the
Nonintercourse Act of 1793. The Native Americans sued the County, and the County in turn
sued the state for indemnification. The federal court exercised ancillary jurisdiction over the
county's indemnification claim. Powell held that the indemnification claim was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. Surprisingly, Stevens agreed with Powell's rulings on the Eleventh
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Scanlon,97 Powell, again writing for the majority on a deeply divided
court, determined that the plaintiff's federal claim for damages against
California was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. He reiterated the
three exceptions to eleventh amendment immunity from Pennhurst 11.98
Justice Powell held that a state's waiver of immunity and consent to suit
must be express and unequivocal, and must refer specifically to federal
court.99 He rejected the plaintiff's argument that a provision of the Cali-
fornia Constitution waiving the state's immunity from suit"°° served to
waive its eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court.'0 1
According to Powell's view, California'.s constitutional provision waived
its immunity to suit only in California courts. '02 He argued that the pro-
vision did not clearly express California's intention to waive its immunity
in federal courts, and hence did not satisfy the waiver or consent excep-
tion. 03 Powell also examined section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
19731o and found no "unequivocal expression of congressional intent to
overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
States." 105 Powell reasoned that Congress may abrogate states' eleventh
amendment immunity only when Congress has made its intention to do
so "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 106 Finally, he
stressed that a state hospital can not be held to have consented to suit in
federal court merely because it received federal funds."17
Justice Brennan dissented in Atascadero, arguing that the original
intent of the Eleventh Amendment and section 504 compel a result other
than the one Powell reached.' 0 8 Brennan argued that the Eleventh
Amendment applies only to those cases based on diversity jurisdiction,
not to cases brought under federal question or subject matter jurisdic-
tion.109 Stevens joined Brennan's dissent, and also wrote a brief separate
Amendment and ancillary jurisdiction, but he dissented from the damage'award, arguing that
the claim was stale.
97. 473 U.S. 234, rehg denied, 473 U.S. 926 (1985). In Atascadero, a physically handi-
capped job applicant alleged that a California state hospital's refusal to hire him was based on
his handicap, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 87 Stat. 394 (1973),
amended by 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
98. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 237-41; see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
99. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240.
100. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5.
101. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241.
102. Id.
103. I d; see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) (amended 1986).
105. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240
106. Id at 242.
107. Id. at 247.
108. Id. at 299-301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id at 301.
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dissent".. in which he called for a fresh examination of the Eleventh
Amendment and for overturning both Hans v. Louisiana"' and
Edelman v. Jordan."2
Brennan's and Stevens' dissents in Atascadero and Pennhurst II pro-
voked Powell to respond. In Atascadero, Powell addressed Brennan's
lengthy dissent in two scathing footnotes, rather than in the text of the
majority opinion as he had Stevens' dissent in Pennhurst 11.11 He
sharply criticized Brennan for "wholly misconceiv[ing] our federal sys-
tem""' 4 and for his "remarkable view of stare decisis."' 5 Powell was
even harder on Justice Stevens, whom he belittled for his inconsistent
positions on stare decisis.16 In particular, Justice Powell noted that Ste-
vens objected to the majority decision in Pennhurst I in part because it
trespassed on notions of stare decisis, while in his Atascadero dissent Ste-
vens sought to overturn two major eleventh amendment cases and their
progeny.'
17
During the week he resigned, in June 1987, Powell issued his last
eleventh amendment decision, writing the majority opinion in Welch v.
State Department of Highways and Public Transportation."' Powell's
opinion construed the Eleventh Amendment as barring an injured state
ferry dock employee from suing a state in federal court under section
110. Id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans was the first case in which the Court expanded the Eleventh
Amendment to provide immunity from suit in federal court to a state that is sued by its own
citizens. Edelman concluded that the Eleventh Amendment immunized states from judge-
ments for retroactive damages in federal court.
112. 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text. The same four members of the Court who dissented in
Atascadero sought, in three subsequent cases, an end to Hans and the cases following Hans as
precedent. Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2965 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 292 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
113. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240 n.2, 243 n.3.
114. Id. at 240 n.2.
115. Id at 243 n.3.
116. Id.
117. Yet Powell is also vunerable to criticism on his use of stare decisis doctrine. Accord-
ing to Stevens, Powell lightly discarded a century of precedent in Pennhurst II and recon-
structed the meaning of Exparte Young in a completely new fashion despite its 80 year history,
while he simultaneously relied on stare decisis to adhere to seemingly distorted constructions
of the Eleventh Amendment in Hans and Edelman. Both Justices Powell and Stevens were
willing to sacrifice consistency in their arguments about the value of precedent and stare deci-
sis as consistency became an impediment to their ends.
118. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
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thirty-three of the Jones Act,119 which utilizes remedies created in the
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA).12 ° Powell, quoting his Atas-
cadero opinion, argued that "[a] general authorization for suit in federal
court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment." '2 1 The language of the Jones Act,
which brings "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment"' 22 within its provisions was, therefore, too general to
establish the necessary, unmistakable congressional intent to abrogate a
state's immunity from suit in federal court.'23 Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor, renewed his
commitment to Hans, its source in federalism, and its progeny. 124 In
response to the four dissenters' tenacious pleas to overrule Hans, Powell
stressed the value of stare decisis and related his version of constitutional
history. As in Atascadero,125 Stevens, along with Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, joined Brennan's dissent.
Powell's and Stevens' heated debates on eleventh amendment issues
did not wane over the years, as did their debates about implied rights of
action. Since the Court's majority is unyielding in its belief that federal-
ism demands maximum protection for states against private suits in fed-
eral court, and the dissenters are equally committed to an alternative
view of federalism, the Court's fundamental split will probably continue
despite Powell's retirement. However, Stevens may be more easily per-
suaded by a new justice than by his long-time adversary.
119. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1915). Welch was unquestionably entitled to relief under the Jones
Act, but question arose as to the proper forum for the suit.
120. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1908). Powell's five-justice majority overruled Parden v. Termi-
nal Railway, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964), a decision by Justice Brennan, permitting employees of a
state-owned railroad to bring actions to redress on-the-job injuries in federal court under the
FELA. According to Powell, the Parden rationale, whereby the Court concluded that Con-
gress had abrogated states' sovereign immunity by making FELA applicable to all railroads
engaged in interstate commerce, did not meet the rigorous standard required to show Con-
gress' clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
121. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2943.
122. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a).
123. Welch, 107 S. Ct at 2944; see supra note 85.
124. Justice Scalia wrote separately to agree with all of the majority opinion except its
discussion of Hans. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2957-58. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). Because of the complexity of the issues involved in reviewing Hans and
overruling it after nearly a century, Scalia wrote that he would leave the question for a case in
which the parties, rather than amicus, raised the issue. Without committing himself to either
side of the debate or to an ultimate judgment on Hans, Scalia hinted he would opt to retain the
Hans rule in the interest of stare decisis.
125. Stevens did write a one-paragraph separate dissent in Atascadero, but relied primarily
on Justice Brennan to express the rationale for his position.
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B. Abstention
Like eleventh amendment issues, abstention issues focus on the pro-
priety of federal court review in certain cases.126 Federal courts have
developed abstention doctrines to protect state sovereignty and promote
notions of comity and federalism. If abstention is appropriate, a federal
court defers jurisdiction to a state court. 127 In some cases, Powell and
Stevens agreed about whether abstention was appropriate.1 28 However,
Stevens generally dissented from opinions in which Powell attempted to
expand the abstension doctrine. 129
Powell and Stevens were at odds on federalism issues in two recent
cases raising abstention questions. In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v.
Dayton Christian Schools,130 Powell joined Rehnquist's majority opinion.
Rehnquist concluded that under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,13 1 the
126. For an overview of the abstention doctrine, see B. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 52, 52A (4th ed. 1983); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER, ch. 9 (1980).
127. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 313 (1943);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 491 (1941). When a federal court abstains, it may
dismiss the case entirely or it may retain jurisdiction pending the outcome of the state
litigation.
128. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (unanimous decision
that Pullman and Younger doctrine abstentions were inappropriate); Middlesex County Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (Powell and Stevens agreed abstention
was proper); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (Powell and Stevens agreed abstention would
have been proper).
129. See, eg., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Trainor v.
Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 460 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. 477 U.S. 619 (1986). The dispute in Dayton Christian Schools arose when a teacher
lodged a sex discrimination complaint with the state civil rights commission against a private
religious school that had not renewed her contract because she was pregnant. The Commis-
sion investigated her case and eventually initiated administrative proceedings. Rather than
participating in the administrative proceedings, the school filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, seeking a permanent injunction against all state proceedings based on the religion
clauses of the First Amendment. The school claimed that the investigation violated its first
amendment rights by inquiring into employment policies that were based on sincerely held
religious beliefs. The asserted religious belief was that mothers should stay home with their
preschool-age children.
131. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine is based on notions of equity
and respect for state functions. Younger held that federal courts should not restrain pending
state proceedings when federal interference will undermine legitimate state activities or con-
cerns. The Younger doctrine arose in the context of a pending state criminal proceeding but
has been expanded to apply to various kinds of civil actions. See, e.g., Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (bar disciplinary proceeding);
Moore v. Sims, 422 U.S. 415 (1979) (child custody proceeding); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977) (contempt proceeding); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (civil action to re-
cover wrongful welfare payments); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (public nui-
sance action).
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district court should have abstained from adjudicating the school's sec-
tion 1983 claim because a pending state administrative proceeding could
fully and fairly adjudicate federal constitutional claims. Justice Rehn-
quist reasoned that the Younger abstention doctrine, originally an admo-
nition against federal court interference in pending state criminal
proceedings, also applies to pending state administrative proceedings that
are judicial in nature, when they concern vital state interests. 132 Accord-
ing to the majority, the district court should have abstained because of
the important state interest in eliminating sex discrimination. If the
Dayton Christian School had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its
constitutional claims in the state administrative proceeding, federal court
interference would offend federalism principles.'33 By joining Rehn-
quist's majority opinion without reservations, Powell reaffirmed his belief
that federalism limits the reach of federal courts, even in suits involving
42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Justice Stevens wrote a short opinion, concurring in the judgment,
in which he rejected the majority's analysis of the abstention issue.13 4
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, Stevens rejected
the Court's application of Younger, and discarded the abstention issue in
one paragraph of a footnote.' 35 Although Stevens ultimately found that
the claims lacked merit, he would not have deprived this section 1983
plaintiff of a federal forum to adjudicate its claim. 3 6
Justices Powell and Stevens continued their abstention debate in
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, In' 137 The question whether the principles of
federalism articulated in Younger v. Harris precluded the federal district
court from enjoining a state proceeding divided the Court and separated
Powell from Stevens. 138
Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that the lower federal
courts should have abstained because of the federalism concerns ad-
132. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. at 627 n.2.
133. Id. at 627.
134. Id. at 629 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
135. Id. at 633-34 n.5. Stevens stated that the Younger abstention rule "has never been
applied to subject a federal court plaintiff to an allegedly unconstitutional state administrative
order when the constitutional challenge to that order can be asserted, if at all, only in state
court judicial review of the administrative proceeding."
136. d at 633-34 nn.4-5.
137. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). Pennzoil won an $11 billion jury verdict against Texaco for
tortiously inducing a third company, Getty Oil, to breach its contract with Pennzoil. Texaco
rushed into federal court to seek an injunction against enforcement of the judgment and to
challenge the Texas law that would require Texaco to post a $13 billion bond before it could
appeal the judgment.
138. Id. at 1536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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dressed in Younger.139 He noted that Texaco had not presented its fed-
eral statutory and constitutional challenges to a state court, even though
there was a pending proceeding in which those claims could have been
raised."4 Powell argued that the federal court should have deferred to
the state proceeding because the state should have the first opportunity to
resolve state and federal issues. 141 Because Pennzoil challenged the en-
forceability of a state court judgment, Powell found that the case in-
volved a state interest that the Younger abstention doctrine and post-
Younger cases were designed to protect: the administration of the state's
judicial system. 42
In Pennzoil, as in Dayton Christian Schools, Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in the judgment. Although each
wrote a separate opinion, all four concurring Justices disagreed with the
Powell majority's Younger abstention analysis.143 Stevens argued that,
for Younger to apply, the state must have a substantive interest in the
ongoing proceedings.'" Next, Stevens determined that, contrary to Pow-
ell's finding, the state proceedings did not involve an important state in-
terest, noting that the only interest Texas had in the dispute was to
provide a forum.'4 5 Stevens accused the majority of "cut[ting] the
Younger doctrine adrift from its original doctrinal moorings which dealt
139. Id. at 1528.
140. Id. at 1529. Instead, Texaco commenced a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court on
the grounds that the appeal bond requirement, as applied, was state action in violation of
Texaco's due process rights.
Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, was disturbed by the majority's assumption that
Texaco's § 1983 action must first be brought in state court. Brennan contended that "[t]his
'blind deference to "States' Rights"' hardly shows 'sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments.'" Id. at 1531 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44).
141. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1526-27.
142. Powell argued that the federal court, by interfering in the ongoing state proceeding,
violated principles of comity and federalism that interlace the system of state and national
governments. See generally cases cited supra note 129.
143. Powell wrote the majority opinion, with Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Scalia join-
ing. Scalia, joined by O'Connor, concurred separately. Marshall filed his own concurrence,
and joined in separate opinions by Brennan and Stevens. Blackmun also concurred separately.
The differences among the four justices who concurred in the Pennzoil judgment, but not in the
rationale, did not involve the applicability of Younger. Even though the four agreed that the
federal court need not abstain based on Younger, two would have precluded the federal court
from hearing the case for other reasons. Justice Marshall believed the district court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case. Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1532 (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Blackmun believed that the district court should have abstained based on
the Pullman abstention doctrine. Id. at 1534 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
144. Id. at 1535 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
145. Id. at 1535 n.2. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also found the state
interest in this case to be "negligible." Id. at 1530 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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with the states' interest in enforcing their criminal laws, and the federal
courts' long-standing reluctance to interfere with such proceedings." 1"
In Pennzoil, Powell again promoted his version of federalism,
designed to curtail the power of federal courts. Stevens and others pro-
tested the majority's disregard for legitimate federal interests and its ex-
cessive deference to state sovereignty.
Powell's and Stevens' differing views on federalism were pivotal in
the Court's five-to-four splits on federalism issues. Powell tried to restrict
the power of federal courts, claiming that to do otherwise would infringe
on states' rights. He believed that a federal court should stay its hand
when any kind of state proceeding exists in which the federal claims can
be raised.147 Stevens, on the other hand, would not restrict federal court
review unless a state has a substantive interest in pending state
proceedings.
C. The Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment
Powell's and Stevens' ideological conflicts on the demands of feder-
alism in the context of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
mimicked their disagreements over the relationship between federal and
state courts in abstention and eleventh amendment cases. In their tenth
amendment/commerce clause debates, the two justices held opposing
views on the federal government's exercise of power over state govern-
ment functions.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery 48 changed the majority approach to tenth amendment issues from
one that gave the federal government substantial leeway in legislating for
the national welfare to one that heavily weighted states' rights. 49 Justice
146. Id. at 1535 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun also expressed
serious concerns about the majority's Younger holding. In his concurrence, Blackmun stated
that requiring abstention in this case "would expand the Younger doctrine to an unprecedented
extent and would effectively allow the invocation of Younger abstention whenever any state
proceeding is ongoing, no matter how attenuated the state's interests are in that proceeding
and no matter what abuses the federal plaintiff might be sustaining." Id. at 1534 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in judgment).
147. See supra notes 126-146 and accompanying text.
148. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). In National League of Cities, the Court invalidated 1974 amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that made the act applicable to state and local govern-
ments. The majority relied on the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on Congress' commerce
clause power to guarantee fair wages and labor standards to all United States workers, includ-
ing employees of state and local governments.
149. Before Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in National League of Cities, the Tenth
Amendment was considered a "truism", not an independent limitation on powers granted to
the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). In Na-
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Powell joined the Rehnquist majority's new federalism rationale. The
majority interpreted the Tenth Amendment and federalism to protect
"traditional" or "essential" state governmental activities from all federal
interference.15 Four justices dissented from Relinquist's opinion. Justice
Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices White and Marshall.' 1 Justice
Stevens dissented separately, expressing disagreement with the wisdom of
the federal legislation but asserting that federalism does not impose a
limitation on Congress' power to enact such legislation.' 52
After National League of Cities, the fragile majority that established
tenth amendment limitations on federal commerce clause power was
threatened.' 53 By 1983, Justice Brennan had obtained the additional
vote he needed to regain the majority on this federalism issue. In Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming,'54 the Court upheld
the application of the 1974 amendment to the Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967115 to Wyoming game wardens. Brennan's majority
found no tenth amendment violation because the interference with Wyo-
ming's.ability to structure its integral operations was insufficient to over-
ride Congress' commerce clause power to ameliorate unjustified age
discrimination in employment. Brennan distinguished National League
of Cities, but referred to it as precedent.'5 6
Stevens concurred separately to declare National League of Cities a
"judicial fiat" that should be reversed.'57 He urged the Court to examine
the political and historical significance of the Commerce Clause and its
tional League of Cities, the majority turned the tables and held that state sovereignty trumps
powers granted to Congress to act for the common welfare.
150. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. Justice Blackmun concurred separately,
qualifying his understanding of the majority opinion. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters accused the majority of using the
Tenth Amendment as a countermajoritarian, antidemocratic tool to invalidate federal legisla-
tion because the majority justices disagreed with the substantive policy underlying the wage
and hour legislation.
152. Id. at 880 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens' dissent is vaguely reminiscent of Justice
Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905), in which Holmes expressed
doubts about the wisdom of legislation setting maximum working hours but emphasized that
the Constitution neither enacts an economic theory, nor confers power on justices of the
Supreme Court to do so.
153. The first success by the National League of Cities dissenters was in Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), in which the Court acknowledged
Congress' power to enact the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and to
dictate some policies for state public utility commissions.
154. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967). The 1974 amendment, like the 1974 amendment to FLSA at
issue in National League of Cities, made the nondiscrimination provisions of the Employment
Act of 1967 applicable to state and local governments.
156. E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243.
157. Id. at 248-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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relationship to the establishment of a national union.' According to
Justice Stevens' historical analysis, the Framers of the Constitution in-
tended the federal government to have unlimited commerce clause
power. He argued that the Framers were primarily concerned with elim-
inating trade barriers and creating a national economy.1 59 Stevens con-
cluded that for Congress to create a truly national market, it needed
power to regulate both private and public sectors."6 As he had in Na-
tional League of Cities, Stevens voiced his personal dislike for minimum-
wage legislation and prohibitions against mandatory retirement, but em-
phasized that it is not within a justice's role to pass on the wisdom of
legislation.'61
Powell, in addition to joining Chief Justice Burger's dissent, dis-
sented separately to debate Stevens on federalism.'62 He ridiculed Ste-
vens' "novel view of our national history",' 63 stressing that the Framers'
central concern was not the elimination of trade barriers among the
states but the formation of a federal system with a tripartite national
government of limited powers, preserving a significant measure of sover-
eign authority for the states.' Powell offered an elaborate analysis of
the language and history of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to
justify his conclusion that federalism concerns dictated both the struc-
ture of the Constitution and the ratification of the Tenth Amendment.
He argued that the debates surrounding the adoption of the Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, and the early decisions of the Supreme Court all sup-
ported his argument. 65 The Framers intended the Tenth Amendment as
a limitation on all the powers of Congress, Powell explained, including
those arising from the Commerce Clause. 166 He contended not only that
Stevens' analysis was historically unsound, but also that Stevens failed to
consider the role of federalism and state sovereignty in our governmental
structure. 67 Powell feared that Stevens' views would permit the federal
government to invoke its commerce clause power to preempt almost any
state function or law. 168 Perhaps Powell's sense that National League of
158. Id. at 248.
159. Id. at 244-45.
160. Id. at 250-51.
161, Id. at 250,
162. Id. at 265 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 268-69.
165. Id. at 269.
166. Id. at 275.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Cities was in jeopardy of being overruled and his awareness of the need to
provide ammunition for its defense prompted his forceful response.
The Court chose Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity169 as the vehicle for overruling National League of Cities.70 Stevens
joined Blackmun's five-member majority,17 ' which reinvested Congress
with its commerce clause power to enforce minimum-wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act against the states. Justice
Blackmun, apparently persuaded by Justices Brennan's and Stevens' ar-
guments, rejected distinctions based on governmental, proprietary, essen-
tial, or traditional government functions as a method for discerning the
requirements of federalism.' 72 Blackmun found no reason to define af-
firmative limits on the exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause. 173  Instead, he explained, congressional power can be
appropriately circumscribed by the internal safeguards of political
processes, which call for state participation in federal government
action. 174
Justice Powell, in a scathing dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, accused the Court of "reject[ing]
almost 200 years of the understanding of the constitutional status of fed-
eralism."' 75 He supported this contention by elaborating on the histori-
cal analysis from his E.EO.C. v. Wyoming dissent. Powell emphasized
that the limitation on federal government interference with state func-
tions is a "matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace."' 176 He
rejected the majority's conclusion that political processes enforce federal-
ism limitations, asserting that the protection of constitutional rights,
such as those rights reserved for the states by the Tenth Amendment,
169. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
170. In a terse separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist forecast a short life for Garcia's majority
opinion and a return to the federalism principles he voiced in National League of Cities. See
supra text accompanying note 150. Rehnquist expressed confidence that his interpretation of
the demands of federalism would "in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. Blackmun provided the fifth majority vote in National League of Cities. By changing
sides, he also provided the fifth vote in Garcia. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying
text.
172. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-57.
173. Id. at 556.
174. Id. at 552.
175. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell's dissent in Garcia is similar in tone and
style to Stevens' dissent in Pennhurst II, written a year earlier, in which Stevens accused Pow-
ell of rejecting a century of eleventh amendment jurisprudence. See supra text accompanying
notes 93-94.
176. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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cannot be left solely to political processes. 177 First, Powell argued that
historically the judiciary was charged with preventing congressional
overreaching.1 78 Second, he disputed the majority's understanding of
democratic processes and the functioning of federal government.
179
Powell noted in particular the majority's misunderstanding of how legis-
lation is drafted: 13 0 bills are rarely the product of local initiatives, rather
they are generated by federal civil servants and staff who have little
knowledge of the localities that will be affected.181 Powell argued that
the majority's ostensible goal, to reinforce self-government and the dem-
ocratic process, would be more effectively accomplished at local and state
levels than at the federal level.18 2 Powell concluded that extension of
age-discrimination proscriptions to states' employment procedures failed
the Tenth Amendment's balancing test, 83 which weighs states' rights
and federalism interests against the potential impact of applying a partic-
ular federal law to the states.
184
Powell's resignation should not affect the dynamics of the Court's
debate on tenth amendment federalism issues because he was firmly en-
trenched in Chief Justice Rehnquist's minority camp.
Powell and Stevens expressed their distinct views of federalism dur-
ing the Court's recent re-engagement with the Tenth Amendment. As
with their differences over separation of powers, the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and abstention doctrine, their tenth amendment debates often took
a personal tone. On federalism issues they regularly fell into the same
opposing factions. Powell was consistently aligned with conservative
Justices Burger, Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor, while Stevens teamed
up with liberal Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Powell and
Stevens were far from "centrists" in the tenth amendment area.
D. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
Preemption and the Supremacy Clause raise many of the same fed-
eralism concerns that the Tenth Amendment raises. In preemption cases
courts must decide whether an activity requires federal uniformity or can
survive simultaneous regulation by federal and state governments,
whether the federal and state laws on the question conflict or are compat-
177. Id. at 566-67.
178. Id. at 567 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
179. Id. at 574-77.
180. Id. at 576.
181. Id. at 576-77.
182. Id. at 576.
183. Id. at 578-79.
184. Id. at 563 n.5, see supra note 170.
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ible, whether federal law occupies the field, and, most importantly,
whether Congress intended to preempt state laws on a particular sub-
ject.'85 Stevens' and Powell's positions are not as clearly opposing on
questions of preemption as they are on other federalism issues. 186 In
cases dealing with antitrust law, business law, and labor law preemption,
however, the two justices have debated in their usual fashion.
1. Antitrust and Business Law
In antitrust and business law, Stevens and Powell often disagreed
about whether federal law preempted state regulation. Their federalism
debates in the antitrust area centered around the judicially created state
action antitrust liability exemption announced in Parker v. Brown.187
The Court designed the Parker exemption to mediate conflicts between
federal antitrust laws and state power to regulate certain intrastate eco-
nomic activities. 188 The exemption applies only to anticompetitive regu-
185. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987); California Fed. Say.
and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987); Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96 (1963).
186. In several cases, Powell and Stevens agreed on preemption issues. See, eg., California
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting, Stevens, J.,
joining) (Stevens and Powell agreeing that California's environmental regulations were in con-
ffict with, and hence preempted by, federal Forest Service regulations); International Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987) (agreeing that federal Clean Water Act preempted state
resident's common law nuisance actions against polluters from same state, but differing over
which other issues should be addressed); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987)
(agreeing ERISA preempts state common law contract and tort actions); Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentine, 470 U.S. 816 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting, Stevens, J., joining) (agreeing
that Death on the High Seas Act did not preempt state wrongful death remedies for nonpecu-
niary losses); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (agreeing that
Nonintercourse Act of 1793 preempted later dealings between Native Americans and County
regarding sales of land, but differing on effects of delay in bringing suit); Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (Powell, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting separately) (agree-
ing that Natural Gas Act "filed rate doctrine" did not preempt state damages actions); Ridg-
way v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (Powell, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting separately)
(agreeing that beneficiary provisions of Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 did not
preempt state divorce decree providing for serviceman's children); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (agreeing that federal law preempted Arizona's power to
impose taxes on motor carrier licenses and fuel usage for timber operations on reservation);
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979), modified, 444 U.S. 816 (agreeing that federal interpretation of Indian treaty governing
entitlement to anadromous fish would prevail over state supreme court interpretation of
treaty); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (agreeing that federal Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 preempted Washington State's tanker law).
187. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
188. Id.
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latory activities expressly directed and actively supervised by the state."8 9
In several cases in which Powell encouraged state regulation and sover-
eignty through extension of the state action exemption, Stevens argued
for federal preemption of state laws. Their positions in the antitrust area
correspond with their differing views of federalism, and in particular with
Stevens' belief that national federalism grew out of a need for a national
market. 190
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 9 ' the Court permitted a treble dam-
age award against an electric utility for tying192 light bulb sales to the
sale of electricity, even though a state regulatory agency had approved
the practice as part of the electric company's rate structure. 193 Stevens,
writing for the majority, argued that since there was no conflict between
federal antitrust laws and state regulations, the two could coexist. 194
Even if a conflict between federal and state laws exists, Stevens con-
tended that federal interests need not always be subordinate to state regu-
lation. 195 Powell joined Justice Stewart's dissent, which argued that
Congress intended to exempt state regulation, including regulation of
state public utilities, from the Sherman Antitrust Act. 196
In Hoover v. Ronwin, 97 the Powell majority held that state bar ex-
aminers were immune from plaintiff's antitrust challenges to state bar
189. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
190. See E.E.O.C. v Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
supra text accompanying notes 158-160.
191. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
192. "rying" is the anticompetitive practice of requiring a purchaser who wishes to buy a
first item over which the seller has monopoly power also to buy a second item.
193. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 585. The state agreed to the tying arrangement in the utility's
tariff application, but did not require it.
194. Id. at 595.
195. Id. at 596. Stevens advocated a limited interpretation of the Parker exemption. Less
than a majority of the Court concurred with Stevens on the proposition that only state officials,
and not private businesses, should enjoy Parker immunity.
196. Id. at 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Powell's position in these antitrust cases, in which
he argued to extend the protections of the state action immunity doctrine to private businesses,
contrasts with his decision in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories,
460 U.S. 150, reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1105 (1983), in which he refused to imply a state exemp-
tion from the Robinson-Patman anti-price-discrimination law for state hospital pharmacies.
197. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). The plaintiff in Hoover, an unsuccessful bar applicant, sued the
Arizona State Bar Examiners, claiming that their grading practices were not designed to assure
that applicants demonstrated a certain level of competence, but were designed to maintain a
monopoly by limiting the number of new lawyers entering state practice. The bar examiners
argued that, because they were appointed by the state supreme court and acted according to
rules of that court, they stood in the shoes of the state and were entitled to the state action
exemption.
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admissions practices. 198 Contrary to Stevens' dissent, 199 Powell did not
find it decisive that the plaintiff did not name the state supreme court as a
party." Powell reasoned that since only the Arizona Supreme Court
had authority to grant or deny admission to practice law in the state, any
bar admission decisions must be viewed as regulatory decisions of the
state.20 1 Powell predicted that Stevens' approach would lead to a regime
in which Sherman Act plaintiffs could look behind the actions of state
sovereigns and base their claims on perceived conspiracies in restraint of
trade among committees, commissions, and others that merely advise the
sovereign.2"2 Powell based his judgment on respect for state sovereignty,
a core federalism concern.
Stevens rejected the notion that Hoover was a suit against the
state.2"3 He acknowledged that the state delegated power to the bar ex-
aminers to set standards for market entry, but noted that there was no
claim that the state court ordered the bar examiners to reduce the
number of lawyers. 2" Because the state had not directed the bar examin-
ers' actions, the bar examiners could not enjoy the state's immunity.2"'
If the examiners abused the power vested in them, Stevens continued,
they should not be able to partake of the state's immunity.20 6 He con-
cluded that a healthy respect for state regulatory policy does not require
antitrust immunity for those who abuse the public trust.20 7
Powell reiterated his position that federal antitrust laws must bend
to state regulation in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United
States.2 °8 Advocating his usual states' rights position, Powell argued that
private parties acting pursuant to a state regulatory policy that permits
anticompetitive conduct are exempt from federal antitrust law, just as
198. Id. at 573.
199. Id at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 573-75.
201. Id. at 573, 580.
202. Id at 580.
203. Id. at 587-92. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Analogizing the bar examiners to a fourteenth-century London bakers' guild with
control over matket entry, prices, and output, Stevens saw potential abuse of power when the
designated regulatory authority over market entry is a private party with a stake in the com-
petitive conditions of the market. Id. at 582-84.
205. Id. at 586.
206. This argument is similar to Steven's dissent in Pennhurst II in which he argued that
state officers who violate state laws could not partake of the state's eleventh amendment sover-
eign immunity. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
207. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. 471 U.S. 48 (1985). In Southern Motor Carriers, state public service commissions
permitted, but did not require, motor carrier rate bureaus to submit collective rate proposals.
When this practice was challenged as violative of antitrust laws, the private rate bureau argued
for an implied immunity from antitrust liability based on the Parker state action exemption.
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private parties that are compelled by state anticompetition regulations
are exempt.' ° According to Powell, the goal of the state action exemp-
tion is to respect federalism and to permit the states some latitude in
their regulatory policies.
Stevens heartily disagreed.210 His dissent, like his majority opinion
in Cantor,211 stressed that when Congress does not create an immunity, it
does not intend one to apply.212 He maintained that private parties
should not be permitted to participate in the state's immunity unless the
state compels their activity.213 Thus, Stevens' view in Southern Motor
Carriers was more moderate than the view he articulated in Cantor,
where he would have denied all private parties use of the state action
exemption absent great state interference in the private party's action.
Stevens identified a distinction between a state regulation requiring cer-
tain behavior and a state regulation permitting the same behavior.21 He
contended that no conflict between antitrust laws and federalism con-
cerns exists when a state merely permits anticompetitive behavior. Ste-
vens then chastised the majority for its misplaced reliance on federalism
rhetoric.
Powell's and Stevens' debates over application of the state action
exemption in antitrust suits echo their debates about federalism in other
contexts. Powell's rhetoric reflects his preference for state sovereignty,
with minimal federal interference. 215 Stevens' dissents advocate adher-
ence to the competitive ideal of the Sherman Act and national markets.
209. Id. at 61-62.
210. Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. See supra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
212. Stevens argued that congressional silence indicates that Congress intended that no
immunity was to be created. This reasoning is parallel to Powell's in Cannon and Merrill
Lynch, see supra notes 21-29, 37-42 and accompanying text, although Stevens disagreed with
Powell in those cases.
213. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
214. In particular, Stevens argued that the exemption protects private parties from liability
for anticompetitive behavior if the state requires that behavior in order to make its regulatory
scheme work. If the state does not compel or require the behavior, then application of the
exemption would go beyond the purpose of the exemption. Id. at 74-75:
215. In his final case involving the application of the Parker exemption, Powell wrote the
Court's majority opinion denying the exemption to the New York State Liquor Authority. 324
Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987). Duffy was about per se violations of antitrust
laws and state exemptions, an issue that traditionally found Stevens and Powell on opposing
sides. In Duffy, however, both determined that the resale price maintenance scheme was a per
se violation of the Sherman Act. Powell generally argued that per se rules should yield to the
"rule of reason" test, and accused Stevens' majority opinions of too much rigidity in their
application of per se rules. See, eg., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. Number 2 v. Hyde, 446 U.S.
2 (1984) (O'Connor, 3., dissenting, Powell, J., joining); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). When Stevens applied a "rule of reason"
test, Powell joined his reasoning. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of
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2. Business Law , ,
Stevens and Powell occupy their usual opposing positions in the area
of business law. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,216 the
Court, with Powell writing for the majority, held that an Indiana statute
regulating tender offers was not preempted by the Williams Act217 and
that the state statute constituted too limited an intrusion upon interstate
commerce to violate the Commerce Clause.218
Stevens joined White's dissent, which found that the state tender
offer law violated the Commerce Clause because it directly regulated the
sale and purchase of stock in interstate commerce. 219 However, White's
dissent agreed with Powell that the Williams Act did not preempt the
Illinois law.220 Stevens did not join that part of White's dissent, again
expressing his preference for national markets over Powell's intense pro-
tection of state sovereignty.22'
Powell favored giving states the utmost latitude by finding exemp-
tions from antitrust liability, or by declaring that the Commerce Clause
and federal laws do not preempt states' capacities to regulate markets.
Stevens preferred to give the national government 'maximum authority to
regulate commerce by permitting antitrust liability for state-related an-
ticompetitive activities, and by finding that state laws regulating business
transactions violate the Commerce Clause if they unduly burden inter-
state commerce.
3. Labor Law
Contrary to the positions they took in other preemption cases, in
labor cases, Powell argued for federal preemption of state labor laws,
while Stevens promoted upholding state labor laws as compatible with
national labor law. In several labor law cases, unlike separation of pow-
ers, eleventh amendment, tenth amendment, and abstention cases, Pow-
University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In Duffy, they both agreed that a per se rule was
appropriate.
Because of his antitrust expertise, see supra note 1, Stevens was usually the spokesperson
for the majority in antitrust cases. He authored the majority opinion in all the cases cited in
this note. Therefore, it is unusual that in Duffy, Powell wrote the majority opinion when
Stevens was a member of the majority.
216. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78m-n (1968), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1982
& Supp. III 1985).
218. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1648.
219. Id. at 1655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. IM. at 1653. Stevens only joined in Part II of White's dissent.
ell aligned himself with Justice Brennan, and Stevens teamed up with
Justice Rehnquist.
Powell concurred with the Brennan majority opinion in Lodge 76,
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Commission,222 which held that federal labor
law preempted a Wisconsin law that made a union's refusal to work over-
time22 an unfair labor practice. To reach this conclusion, the majority
had to overrule the Briggs-Stratton doctrine, 24 which declared that the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)2 25 did not preempt state power
to regulate partial strikes.226 In his separate concurrence, Powell agreed
that the Briggs-Stratton doctrine should be overruled, but argued that the
preemptive effect of a federal labor law depends on whether the state law
interferes with the balance that the NLRA established between manage-
ment and labor.227 He argued that the Wisconsin law curtailed the
union's self-help capability and resulted in a significant shift in the bal-
ance of free economic bargaining.228 Therefore, he concluded, federal la-
bor law preempted the Wisconsin law.229
Stevens wrote a dissent specifically disagreeing with Powell's con-
currence.230 He interpreted congressional silence on the issue of partial
strikes as an invitation for state regulation.23' According to Stevens, the
Court could not claim to implement congressional intent when Congress
had neither spoken on the issue of partial strikes nor legislatively over-
ruled the Briggs-Stratton doctrine.232 He was not persuaded by Powell's
argument that regulation of partial strikes disrupts the balance of power
between employer and employee.233
222. 427 U.S. 132, 155 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
223. In labor law, a refusal to work overtime is also known as a partial strike.
224. The Briggs-Stratton doctrine originated in the 1949 case of Automobile Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1935).
226. Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 151.
227. Id. at 155-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 156. Powell noted that if the state law had only an incidental effect on bargain-
ing position and reflected a neutral policy, the law would not be preempted.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 156 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 158.
232. Id. at 159.
233. Id. at 158-59. Stevens also objected to the majority's willingness to discard the quar-
ter-century-old Briggs-Stratton rule. See supra note 117 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Stevens' and Powell's use and rejection of stare decisis. Stevens predicted that labor-
management relations would be disrupted more by the abolishment of the Briggs-Stratton rule
than by state regulation of partial strikes. Id. at 159.
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Powell's advocacy of federal preemption of state labor laws led him
to dissent from Stevens' plurality opinion in New York Telephone Co. v.
New York State Department of Labor.23 4 Stevens found that Congress
had been silent about whether states could enact unemployment compen-
sation statutes that paid benefits to strikers. Consistent with his decision
in Lodge 76, Stevens refused to interpret congressional silence as evi-
dence of congressional intent to preempt or prohibit specific state labor
law provisions.235 Powell, on the other hand, found that state law was
preempted because granting unemployment compensation benefits to
strikers upset the bargaining balance.236
In Belknap v. Hale,237 Stevens predictably joined the majority deci-
sion, which held that federal labor law did not preempt a breach of con-
tract action under state law by replacement workers against employers.
Powell joined Brennan's dissent, contending that federal law preempted
the state suits and prevented replacement workers from suing for breach
of contract when they were terminated and strikers rehired in their
place.238 Powell believed that suits for breach of contract affected the
bargaining balance. Thus, according to his reasoning in Lodge 76, such
suits should be preempted by federal law.239
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters2' is not in alignment with other cases in the Powell-Stevens
labor law debate. Stevens' majority opinion in Sears reflected his familiar
position that federal labor law does not preempt state laws.241 Powell,
surprisingly, concurred, concluding that the NLRA242 does not preempt
state trespass laws and that picketers could therefore be enjoined from
234. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
235. Id at 540, 561. Note the contradictions of Stevens' argument regarding congressional
silence in New York Telephone with his arguments in the antitrust state immunity cases. See
supra text accompanying notes 187-214. Stevens argued that congressional silence empowers
states to act in labor cases, but disempowers states in antitrust cases.
The difficulty in reconciling Stevens' arguments on congressional silence results from his
inconsistent framing of the issues. If Congress does not positively create a state exemption
from liability in the antitrust context, Stevens considers the silence evidence of congressional
intent for no exemption. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. The lack of prohibition
in labor and implied rights of action cases, however, is, according to Stevens, an open door for
action by states or federal courts. See supra notes 231 & 235 and accompanying text. Thus,
Stevens reached different results based on whether he framed congressional silence as the "ab-
sence of a prohibition" or the "absence of a positive act of creation."
236. New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
237. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
238. Id. at 523, 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting, Powell, J., and Marshall, J., joining).
239. Id. at 524.
240. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
241. Id. at 198.
242. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1935).
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continuing to trespass.24 3 Powell reasoned that a dispute about whether
picketers are trespassing on an employer's premises is not the type of
conflict that can be timely resolved by the National Labor Relations
Board, and therefore state laws were not preempted.
244
Except for a digression in Sears, Powell shifted from the steadfast
state sovereignty position he maintained in business, antitrust, tenth
amendment, eleventh amendment, and abstention cases to a position ad-
vocating a unitary, national approach of federal preemption in the labor
law area. Stevens, on the other hand, a strong champion of a national
market and federal dominance in antitrust, commerce, tenth amendment,
eleventh amendment, and implied remedies cases, rejected federal pre-
dominance in cases involving issues of labor-management relations. 245
The startling difference between Powell's and Stevens' positions in labor
law cases and their positions in other cases may reflect their perception of
hidden biases in federal labor law. No clear patterns emerge even when
their opinions are examined from promanagement or prolabor political
perspectives.246 The labor law preemption opinions stand out as anoma-
lies among Powell's and Stevens' debates about the appropriate balance
between state and federal governments.
Conclusion
During the last decade, a battle raged between Justices Powell and
Stevens, the Supreme Court's so-called "centrists",247 on issues funda-
mental to the constitutional balance of power. Far from being centrist on
issues involving the structure of government, Powell and Stevens had
strongly opposing views. They vigorously disagreed with one another
about the proper allocation of power between Congress and the federal
courts248 and between state and federal government.24 9 Their debates on
243. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 436 U.S. at 212-14 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell was par-
ticularly concerned about the inadequacy of federal labor law to remedy the creation of a
temporary easement on the employer's property.
244. Id. at 213.
245. For a related case involving issues of preemption and employment law, but not federal
labor law, see California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). In Guerra,
Stevens and Powell are again on opposite sides of a preemption issue, and in the unusual
posture that is characteristic of their labor decisions. Powell supported federal law preemption
instead of state sovereignty, and Stevens supported state law despite a clear national scheme.
246. For example, Stevens' opinions aided union workers in New York Telephone, but
aided management in Lodge 76, Sears, and Belknap. Powell favored labor in Lodge 76 and
Belknap, but not in Sears or New York Telephone.
247. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 6-67 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 68-221 and accompanying text.
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the nature and requirements of federalism, its constitutional and histori-
cal underpinnings, and its continuing force saturate their opinions. The
Court's two factions often designated Powell and Stevens to present their
conflicting views on implying private damages actions from federal stat-
utes, abstention, the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and preemption.
Their polemics occasionally rose to bitter levels, textual attacks, and as-
saultive footnotes. At other times, in softened tones, they doggedly per-
sisted in articulating their independent visions.
This concentrated study of their interactions allows the reader to see
the Supreme Court from a new perspective. Powell and Stevens no
longer appear to be centrists; rather they are fixed at opposite ends of the
debates, and Court doctrine develops in response to their interactions.
The Powell-Stevens debates created much of the law governing the impli-
cation of private damages actions under federal statutes25  and the Con-
stitution,2"' the separation of powers between Congress and the courts,252
eleventh amendment doctrine,5 3 tenth amendment doctrine,254 preemp-
tion,255 and abstention.25 6 Powell was a steadfast advocate of state sover-
eignty and minimal federal interference in state activities in cases that he
characterized as involving federalism issues. He sought to restrain fed-
eral courts in relation to Congress and state courts. Stevens' brand of
federalism recognized that national unity is primary. Stevens would also
give the courts more power than Powell would allow them. For over a
decade the two justices struggled over these contrasting visions of gov-
ernment structure. Powell's and Stevens' opposing views paralleled the
differences between the Court's conservative and liberal factions.
Supreme Court jurisprudence is multifaceted. Therefore, it is valua-
ble to step back from the dominant modes of analysis and regard the
dynamics of the Court from new perspectives. Scholars should examine
the relationships among justices and how their interpersonal, ideological
battles affect the development of the law. This Article examines debates
between Justices Powell and Stevens, focusing on the effects of their in-
teractions on federalism and separation of powers principles. Relation-
ships between other justices should be studied, perhaps uncovering
similar debates affecting constitutional jurisprudence.
250. See supra notes 6-42 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 70-125 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 148-184 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 185-246 and accompanying text.
256. See supra hotes 126-147 and accompanying text.
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Table I.
MAJORITY VOTES
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Powell * 113 108 111 108 106 113 131 137 131 131 129
Powell % ** 89.7 83.7 85.4 81.8 86.9 80.1 86.8 90.7 94.2 89.7 89.0
Stevens * 97 99 103 99 90 109 104 98 98 92 92
Stevens % ** 77.0 76.7 79.2 75.0 73.8 77.3 68.9 64.9 70.5 63.0 63.5
* Number of cases each term in which this justice was part of the majority.
•* Percentage of total Court cases each term in which this justice agreed with the majority.
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Table II.
DISSENTING VOTES
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Powell* 13 21 19 24 16 28 20 14 8 15 16
Powell % ** 10.3 16.3 14.6 18.2 13.1 19.9 13.2 9.3 5.8 10.3 11
Stevens * 29 30 27 33 32 32 47 53 41 54 53
Stevens % ** 23.0 23.3 20.8 25.0 26.2 22.7 31.1 35.1 29.5 37.0 36.5
• Number of cases in which this justice cast a dissenting vote each term.
•* Percentage of total Court cases in which this justice was in dissent each term.
